Hu Shih and John Dewey: 'scientific method' in the May Fourth era – China 1919 and after

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In the post-structuralist climate of 'Against Theory' and' Against Method', it seems more trendy and secure to deal with' theoretical anarchism' than those dated' law-and-order alternatives '.1 This is what the late Paul de Man has to say about the incompatibility between truth and method:

A question arises only if a tension develops between methods of understanding and the knowledge which those methods allow one to reach. If there is indeed something about literature, as such, which allows for a discrepancy between truth and method, between Wahrheit and Methode, then scholarship and theory are no longer compatible... For a method that cannot be made to suit the' truth' of its object can only teach delusion.2

(Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory, p. 4)

Here de Man echoes no doubt a strong critique of the ravishment of Geisteswissenschaften by the ‘scientific method’ since the nineteenth century,3 in addition to his own reflection on the inherent aporia of literary language. However, given the essential prejudicial nature of human knowledge, it remains moot whether there can be any discrepancy between truth and method, whether there is Truth beyond a method, and indeed whether any method can be made otherwise than to suit its own truth. Let the argument stand unresolved and let me for the moment turn to Hu Shih (1891-1962).

Why Hu Shih (yet once more)!4 The only sensible question today ought to be 'How not to talk about Hu Shih?' rather than' How to talk about him?'. Everything that can be said has already been said. A little consciousness is surely a dangerous thing -talking about Hu Shih is tantamount to putting into one's mouth the same rhetoric of history /modernity5 which had once implicated the revolutionary Hu Shih himself. That is, one is forever caught up in a Romantic irony, driven and derided by the desire to be unprecedented, as well as the fear of deja lu, of having already been forestalled. But when one is called upon to address a distinguished gathering on the suicidal topic of 'Research Methods in the May Fourth Era', whom else to begin with but Hu Shih
who has insisted, consistently, on the use of an ill-defined scientific method?

Hu characterises his novum organum as experiential (which should be
distinguished from empirical in the Deweyan context), inductive, verificatory, and
evolutionary. This' lucid' and' discriminating' new method has been variously labelled
as pragmatism, instrumentalism, experimentalism, empiricism, positivism and
utilitarianism. The confusion of terms results sometimes from Hu's own translation,
e.g. 'empiricism' as 實驗派 shiyan pai but 'pragmatism' as 實驗主義 shiyan
zhuyi; sometimes from critics' difficulty in restoring from the Chinese the exact
English terms Hu uses or has in mind on various occasions. A notable example is 歷史態度 lishi taidu (the historical attitude) which only when Hu bothers to provide the source can one realise refers to 'the genetic method'.

Since none of the aforementioned terms is of native Chinese origin, perhaps one
should tackle the issue via Hu Shih's favourable attitude towards imported concepts.
In July 1919, he remarks: 'I am all for the enterprise of importing doctrines and
intellectual trends' (HSWC, II, 274). He specifically outlines the methodology of
importation as involving the knowledge of (1) the milieu in which the doctrine
originated, (2) the life and intellectual heritage of the person responsible for this
document, and (3) the effects (consequences) of the doctrine. The fulfillment of these
three conditions constitutes the historical attitude (ibid., 378), in Hu's words, 'the
genetic method' (HSWC, 1,296), which curiously is a 'product of the pragmatist's
application of evolutionism to philosophy' (ibid.).

In his introduction to American pragmatism (HSWC, I, 291-341), Hu focusses on
the consequences and relevancy of concepts in both Charles S. Peirce and William
James, and highlights the experimental and creative nature of experience in John
Dewey. With Hu Shih, Dewey's methodology of pragmatism consists of the historical
(genetic?) method and the experimental method. The latter always starts working
from concrete facts and situations, and is based on the assumption that all theories are
hypothetical in nature and as such can only be verified through practice (HSWC, I,
381). This experimental method is based on 'experimental thinking' or 'scientific
reasoning', a 'conjoint process of analysis and synthesis '.\(^9\) It is an enquiry procedure
which is progressive, purposive, and essentially practical in orientation.\(^10\)

Since praxis is the ultimate arbiter of theoria, one may question the very
usefulness of doing theory at all. This familiar topic has recently involved a dozen
American critics from opposing camps\(^11\) although, after two generations which have
witnessed at least two major paradigm shifts, viz. analytical philosophy and perhaps
deconstruction, none of the new pragmatists -- most of whom being literary critics
rather than philosophers by profession --would subscribe to the scientific (in Richard
Rorty's word, 'scientistic') method coupled with evolutionism. Dewey himself has
equated pragmatism with an observational and experimental method and asserted that all the discussion of ideas, their truth and reality' serves to exemplify or enforce' the method.¹³ With theoretical, especially metaphysical, matters held in abeyance, 'methodological pragmatism' then sets itself the task of solving problems and can be assessed only in terms of the method's practical/affective success.¹⁴

Hu Shih quotes Dewey's division of thought into five distinct steps: (1) [identification of] a felt difficulty; (2) [explanation of] its location and definition; (3) suggestion of possible solution; (4) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (5) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief.¹⁵ He applies Dewey's strategies to two situations that call for creative problem-solving: someone lost in the woods trying to find a way out; and more interestingly for our purpose, a passage in Mozi's xiaogu 小取 ('The smaller pick ').¹⁶

Textual mediation being in praesentia or in absentia, the two situations apparently belong to different orders of hermeneutics and thus call for different kinds of praxis, but they serve to test the extent to which the experimental method can be stretched so as to cover both natural sciences and human sciences. The passage and Graham's rendition read:

辟也者舉也物而以名之也
'Illustrating' is referring to other things in order to clarify one's case.¹⁷ (HSCW, I, 324)

Hu Shih observes that on first reading, one is puzzled by 舉也物 ju ye wu which testifies to a shared 'felt difficulty' among interpreters. The annotator Bi Yuan. 畢沅 (1730-1797) glosses ye 也 as an unwitting redundancy on the part of the scribe and suggests that it be deleted. When Wang Niansun 王念孫 (1744-1832) reads the gloss, he believes Bi Yuan has not correctly identified the 'location' of the 'felt difficulty' before arriving at his hasty conclusion. According to Hu Shih, the true 'location' and hence 'solution' do not lie in redundancy since the word is there, but in the word's explicable, and Wang has supplied a more convincing solution, viz. ye as a variant of ta 他. Now there are two possible readings, two 'solutions' for the exegete to consider. In conformity with traditional method of exegesis which allows no redundancy unexplained (最忌無故衍字), and in the context of the passage under discussion as well as in the larger context of Mohist corpus which provides other pieces of evidence, Wang's reading proves a more satisfactory solution.

It is not entirely accidental that in his introduction to pragmatism (shiyian zhuyi) Hu uses an example from the history of annotation of the Mohist text to illustrate Dewey's enquiry procedure. One may compare this with Hu's description of the three
laws of reasoning according to Mozi (Moh Tih): (1) there must be a basis or
foundation; (2) there must be a general survey; (3) there must be practical
application. Such instances raise the question of influence: whether or not Hu Shih
is really indebted to Dewey in that he applies the latter's analytical method as a
metacritical instrument to comment on traditional exegesis; or whether, by means of
rapprochement, Hu is simply making two alien traditions converge because to him the
two traditions share, at least in this instance, similar procedures. The question is not
easy to answer for dozens of examples or counter-examples can be assembled to
support both views. In the case of the broader Mohist text, Hu's reading is enriched by
references to propositional and inferential logic as well as modern concepts of syntax
and semantics. But when one turns to Hu's discussion of the logic of Moh Tih in his
doctoral dissertation, one finds it deplorably wanting because the so-called 'pragmatic
method' of Moh Tih turns out to be a general concern about the 'practical
consequences' and applicability to 'real situations' of ethical and moral universals.

Perhaps one should make allowance for Hu Shih's imported simplified version of
pragmatism -- and for that matter the early Dewey's amongst the thirteen versions
lampooned by Lovejoy -- for being a philosophy 'on the public scene'. This
non-professional philosophy is capable of providing at most a doxa instead of an
episteme, and it lacks the rigour and systematicity required of scientific knowledge.
One is therefore tempted and justified to question the theoretical assumption of this
'scientific method'. Despite its biological and sociological models --two major frames
of reference in nineteenth-century scholarship which has come under severe attack
under the all-embracing misnomer of 'positivism', -- the scientific method proposed
here is simplistic in that it has failed to equip itself with a metacriticism to reflect on
its own theoretical stance and methodological limits; or, in post-Kantian parlance, it
has failed to account for the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. When
appropriated as an instrument for textual studies, it has very little to contribute in
substance to traditional textual criticism and exegesis. But in all fairness, after the
linguistic turn which separates the old and the new pragmatism, after the
epistemological rupture which has given rise to philosophical hermeneutics and
outdated its philological precursor, it is no longer an elegant thing to do to criticise
Hu Shih's 'scientific method'.

The aforementioned example from the Mohist text serves as the point of
departure for my excursion into the triangular relationship of negative influence into
which Hu Shih, Tradition, and his Western model(s) enter. With historical hindsight,
one cannot fail to perceive the simplicity of this highly reductionist but once popular
notion, which claims to explain the underlying mechanism of cross-cultural reception.
Through critical elaboration in the sixties and seventies, the now obsolete term has
obtained two distinct but related meanings. First, on the individual level, it refers to
the phenomenon of a receiver's 'misreading' of his foreign sources. Second, it refers to
the phenomenon of reception that involves the contact and interaction of two cultural
systems. The receiver (e.g. Hu Shih), who at the same time plays the role of a
mediator, introduces into his own culture a foreign trend (e.g. pragmatism), which is
often adulterated through the mediator's axiological transcoding process into a
metatext (e.g. Hu's article, 'shiyan zhuyi'), as a polemical strategy to debunk existing
norms in his own tradition. In this case, what the receiver deviates from is not the
'original' alien message dispatched, say, by Dewey, but his native cultural heritage, his
rivaling contemporaries, or the 'normal science' of the time.

But Hu Shih's case is more complicated than it seems and can hardly be
dismissed by the aforesaid triangular relationship in negative influence. His story can
be told differently and each version would entail different consequences. The first
version sees Hu Shih indeed under Western influence --despite the fact that the very
concept of influence has been problematised for its naive positivism. Dewey's
doctrines, especially his experimental logic, provide him with a perceptual model, a
set of interpretative strategies, indeed a metalanguage, through which he is able to
reread and reassess the tradition. One is immediately reminded of Hu's criticism of
Song philosophers for their lack of experimental procedure in logical method and
Hu's use of classical, pre-symbolic logic to elucidate the cryptic text of
post-Confucian dialecticians, including Gongsun Long 公孫龍 (circa 320-250 BC). But
this reference to the dialecticians can be a double bind, at once to support and
undermine the assumption of negative influence. For, as Hu observes, all that is new
in this novum organum is already very old in the non-Confucian tradition:

The emphasis on experience as against dogmatism and rationalism, the highly
developed scientific method in all its phases of operation, and the historical or
evolutionary view of truth and morality, --these which I consider as the most
important contributions of modern philosophy in the Western world, can all find their
remote but highly developed precursors in those great non-Confucian schools of the
fifth, fourth, and third centuries BC.

(The Development of the Logical Method, p. 9)

This passage shows Hu's characteristic strategy of reading, which will be worth
our while to scrutinise. At first glance, Hu is paying homage to the alternative
analytical tradition in pre-Qin China. What Hu has found in Dewey and others can be
also found in China. Here Hu Shih has aligned himself with the traditionalists. To
paraphrase Panofsky's famous account of the Renaissance: 'The "modern" style
of the May Fourth is nothing but the "good antique style" (buona maniera antica). However, Hu could not have made such an observation without having familiarised himself with Deweyan pragmatism in the first instance.

In the same line of thinking, Hu has come to acclaim and canonize some late Ming and early Qing scholars, such as Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613-1682), the Fes 費氏, Jiao Xün 焦循 (1763-1820), Ruan Yuan 阮元 (1763-1849), and particularly Dai Zheng 戴震 (1723-1777) for their scientific reasoning and pragmatic praxis. He praises the obscure Fe Jinyü 費經虞 (1599-1671) and Fe Mi 費密 (1623-1699) for their agnosticism, their anti-metaphysical (Daotong 道統) position, and their interest in empiricism.

Hu's hagiography of Dai Zheng is as interesting as it is puzzling if one takes into account the rhetoric of revolution they both share. One can ignore his occasional hit-and-run comparisons, where Dai Zheng is likened now to Leibniz, now to Bentham and J. S. Mill. According to Hu Shih, Dai Zheng was a direct descendent of the kaozheng 考證 (research and verification) school founded and developed by Gu Yangwu and Yan Ruojü 閻若璩 (1636-1704). The methodology of his scholarship is characterised by two types of reasoning: fine analysis and verification. Detailed analysis of objects leads to li 理; comparisons and synthesis give rise to ze 則. Li and Ze join to form a hypothetical li; but this li needs ultimate verification and application.

Like his precursor Gu Yanwu who is well-known for his quotidian praxis, the practical-minded Dai participates actively in the 'anti-metaphysical' movement launched at the turn of the Dynasty, and he most powerfully articulates its two major projects: 'pragmatism' and the scholarship devoted to the Jings 經 (Confucian canons). Hu observes that this Qing Jingxue 經學 (School of Canonical Studies) has four characteristics: (1) the historical perspective, (2) the discovery of an organum, (3) the inductive method, and (4) emphasis on textual evidence (ibid., 9). Let me bracket the problematic of historical perspective for the moment; suffice it to know that it serves as a guiding principle for all the three instrumental aspects. The organum consists mainly of two traditional disciplines: jiaocho 校讎 (textual criticism) and shengyin xungu 聲韻訓詁 (philological exegesis). These are performed by a thorough cross-referential study as well as exhaustive collection of all bits of textual evidence, including benjeng 本證 (evidence from within the corpus) and pangjeng 旁證 (evidence from beyond the corpus).

In Hu's evaluation, Qing Confucian scholars' greatest contribution lies in the importance they accord to evidence; without evidence there would be no Qing jingxue. And amongst all the Qing scholars, Dai Zheng is the only one that has mastered the art of holistic comprehension (tonghe 通核).
However, if one examines the achievements of Dai Zheng and the others acclaimed by Hu Shih, one would find they represent extremely traditional 小學 (i.e. 'small learning' dealing mainly with philology) scholarship, such as textual criticism and philological research established as early as the Han Dynasty, but refined by Qing scholars, but they are nothing Deweyan. Indeed, Hu's own canonised status in modern Chinese literary scholarship is mainly due to his contribution to the continuation of the exegetical tradition.

This observation forces us to rethink Hu's relationship with tradition and Dewey. I shall opt for an alternative version of the story. Earlier I have pointed out Hu's transcoding of Dewey with axiological input into a metatext, so that it could perform an extratextual social (i.e. pragmatic) function. However, in order to perform such a function, this meta text cannot be restricted to the narrow sense of referring to an individual text, such as the article entitled 'Shiyan zhuyi', but it involves a complicated process of metatextualisation, which is as translinguistical (i.e. between linguistic and other systems) as it is interlinguistical (i.e. between two linguistic systems). As such, it cannot be free from ideology -- the anti-ideological liberalism of pragmatists has to be an ideology in the first place. This metalanguage is a system designed for the specific purpose of describing another system, which has become its object-language. In the case under discussion, since at least two cultural systems are in contact, the relationship is more inter-systemic in the cross-cultural sense than inter-systemic within the confines of one cultural polysystem.

Now the picture seems clear. Hu has trans coded Dewey's pragmatism and developed it into a metalanguage to re-present traditional textual and philological scholarship. One is not surprised -- which means one can always be surprised -- to find Hu untiringly repeating, often with polemic thrusts, such catch phrases as 'scientific method', 'experimental spirit', 'hypothesis', 'verification', 'evidence', 'analysis and synthesis', 'historical principle', 'evolutionism', etc. Nor should one be surprised at the poor performance of this metalanguage because, on the one hand, it has never been rigorous enough to be a heuristic tool or discovery procedure, which is a prerequisite of scientific language, and on the other, it is flawed with another level of basically incompatible political discourse. It remains, after all, a rhetoric. A further observation can be made regarding the essential disjunction between Hu's metalanguage and the object-language it sets to describe. Whilst Hu uses an ineffective metalanguage to evaluate his object-language, he follows in the footsteps of his Qing predecessors to continue producing that object-language quite successfully. Perhaps one should hazard another version, i.e. examining the relationship between a different kind of metalanguage and object-language within the closure of Qing scholarship before crossing the borders.
Hu's metalanguage is by no means a purely descriptive system; it is, rather, a discursive network consisting of different levels to allow for intra-systemic functional trans coding. Here the axiological factor has a major role to play. To be consistent with pragmatism 'on the public scene' Hu has charged his trans coded metatext with the task of being a social critique rather than an organum for scientific enquiry. He is quite successful in this, because he has introduced into it tropics of discourse, in particular a cluster of militaristic figures. His book on Dai Zheng fully bears out the use of this revolutionary rhetoric.\(^{30}\) If one may be allowed to draw an analogy with classical training of trivium in the West, where rhetoric mediates and subverts grammar and logic amongst the three disciplines related to language, one would certainly agree that Hu's rhetoric has enfeebled the other two language instruments he has laid claim to. Such linguistic reflexions, plus self-reflexion, might lead to a narrative as to why in China the logical school Hu endorses never really thrived.\(^{31}\)

To be sure, one can level a critique of Hu Shih on account of his blindness to his own historicity, from the vantage point of which he has projected a transcendental' scientific methodicity' unto the historical past. Ironically, the banality and non-methodicity of his introduced procedure make it appear to have universal applicability and thus appealing to the public. His historical method (*lishi taidu*) is so flawed by pseudo-historicism and a vicious circle that one cannot but joke: 'There is madness in his method!' Hu has more than once proposed using the comparative method, one direction of which is 'historical perspective'.\(^{32}\) But what Hu urgently wants is no other than a genuine historical understanding essential to philosophical hermeneutics.\(^{33}\) Such historical understanding does not refer to the' genetic method', i.e. tracing the bio-historical development of the materiality of language and text, or a 'thorough' knowledge of the exegetical tradition, but an awareness of the structure of historical understanding as well as a profound and sometimes tragic reflexion on one's belatedness.

Let me conclude this short paper by briefly and rather casually commenting on the now dated genetic method and evolutionism, which Hu Shih identifies with historical principle. I would like to observe that evolutionism had become a master-code, a *grand récit* of nineteenth-century scholarship, long before Dewey's marrying it to pragmatism. I shall limit myself to literary history. Whilst major French literary historians, following Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve, all draw on biology, it is Brunetière who has most explicitly formulated his evolutionist poetics.\(^{34}\) Brunetiere's interest, however, lies in national literatures rather than interliterary process. Since my topic is a comparative study, I shall invoke a forerunner of our discipline.

In the first full-length book in English on comparative literature (1886), H. M. Posnett identifies the objects of comparative enquiry to be 'these internal and external
aspects of literary growth' (my emphasis) which are substantial results of causes which can be specified and described. The internal and external forces enter into a dialectic relationship because national literature has been developed from within as well as from without. But Posnett asserts that 'the comparative study of this internal development is of far greater interest than that of the external, because the former is less a matter of imitation and more an evolution directly dependent on social and physical causes'.

Posnett's observation is of particular relevance to our discussion of intercultural historical process. The author has called our attention to two important issues. First, one should not in the first instance pay too much attention to external development, e.g. the influence of Dewey in China, because internal evolution is liable to be obscured or altogether concealed by the imitation of foreign models. Second, according to the law of evolution, all societies undergo the similar twofold development of expansion and specialisation. There is no denying that in our time very few lucid thinkers, if any, still believe in such a grand narrative as the law of evolution. However, whilst the first point of Posnett is not easily refuted, the second is quite revelatory in that it serves to put into question the mechanistic law of causality, e.g. 'Because Hu Shih has studied with Dewey and received his pragmatism, he logically puts what he believes into practice in the case of China, and therefore a series of consequences takes place.' And, more importantly, external development can hardly take place without internal evolution having already taken place. With such dialectical thinking, the issue of influence can be dismissed.

Posnett's project has anticipated similar resolutions of the dichotomy between genetic contacts and typological analogies by such great East and Central European scholars as Jurij Tynjanov, Victor M. Schirimunsky (Zhirmunsky) and Dionyz Durišin, the first two Formalists being Hu Shih's contemporaries in the May Fourth Era. Like Hu Shih, they happen to be interested in evolutionism, not because they believe in biological evolution; nor do they care very much for philosophy on the public scene. They can be called' evolutionists' only in the broadest possible sense that their projects are very much concerned with the dynamics of literary and especially interliterary process. Their achievements, amongst other things, are founded on the successful marriage of a rigorous scientific method, viz. systems science, to genuine historical understanding. With this tribute to the Prague Circle, their precursors and followers, I conclude my critique of Hu's 'scientific method'.

NOTES


4. Hu Shih (1891-1962) was the central figure of the new literary movement launched in 1917. Among other things, he was the chief promoter of vernacular literature, a practitioner of new poetry, but at the same time a historian and positivistic philologist. Supposedly a student of John Dewey's at Columbia University, Hu became a professor at Peking (Beijing) University in 1917, served as Chinese Ambassador to USA in 1938-42, and was President of Taiwan's Academia Sinica until his death in 1962. A prolific writer in his own right, Hu has become the subject of numerous studies. See Jerome B. Grieder, *Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance.. Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937* (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1970) and Min-chih Chou, *Hu Shih and Intellectual Choice in Modern China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984).

5. Paul de Man, 'Literary History and Literary Modernity', in his *Blindness and Insight*, second edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 142-65. The kind of paradox between history and modernity which de Man discusses is perfectly applicable to the case of Hu Shih and his co-revolutionaries in the May 'Fourth cultural movement. The so-called May Fourth movement in 1919 originally started as a students' demonstration against the Treaty of Versailles signed after World War I, but it soon became a general political and cultural movement whose impact is still being felt in contemporary China. A classic study of the intellectual milieu is Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement.. Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

6. The embryo of this article was a workshop on the May Fourth Movement held at Charles University, in Prague, the Czech Republic, on 24-27 August 1994. Rather than addressing myself to the topic of research methods, I am concerned here only with 'the scientific method' which Hu Shih promulgates. I am aware that any metamethodology needs to include, among other things, a typology of methods, considerations of the homogeneity/heterogeneity between method and truth, and considerations of human variables, and ways of assessment. For pragmatism, Nicholas Rescher has developed a methodological version in his *Methodological Pragmatism.. A Systems- Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge* (New York: New York University Press, 1977). As practically all aspects of Hu Shih have been
exhaustively studied, it may seem futile to write another paper on him. In addition to my discussion of metalanguage, my intention is to rewrite the story of Hu Shih through a series of cultural displacements and moments of historical discontinuity, which brought me to Prague in 1994, long after my first encounter with writings of the Prague Linguistic Circle and subsequent friendship with Lubomir Dolezel, and through him, Elinor Shaffer.


10. Rescher, *ibid*.


16. The *xiaoku* is a chapter of the Mohist canon which deals with ancient Chinese logic.


33. It would not be fair to press for a pre-Gadamerian hermeneutics in early Republican China. Incidentally, Heidegger's *Being and Time* was published in 1927 not long after the May Fourth Movement. Even a positivist would be bold enough to suspect that Hu Shih was not aware of its existence -it had to wait until a new pragmatist like Richard Rorty to attempt to reconcile the American and continental traditions. Otherwise, the scientism Hu advocated could have been refined, if not renounced, and a different chapter of cross-cultural fertilisation of ideas could have been written.